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Apples and Oranges and Olives? Oh my! 
FELLERS, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT, AND THE 
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the 2003-2004 term, the Supreme Court decided 
three cases1 involving the admissibility of derivative evidence 
obtained through the use of unwarned statements, thus 
making this period a unique and important one for criminal 
defendants and their rights against self-incrimination and to 
counsel, as protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.2  
This Comment focuses on the first of these decisions, Fellers v. 
  
 1 Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004); United States v. Patane, 124 
S. Ct 2620 (2004); and Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct 2601 (2004). 
 2 In contrast, in its 2002-2003 term the Court heard only one case in which 
the right against self-incrimination was the primary issue: Chavez v. Martinez, 538 
U.S. 760 (2003).  Lt. Col. David H. Robertson, Self-Incrimination: Big Changes in the 
Wind, ARMY LAW., May 2004, at 37, 37.  In its 2004-2005 term the Court did not hear 
any cases in which the right against self-incrimination was the primary issue.  Medill 
School of Journalism, On the Docket: U.S. Supreme Court 2004-2005 Case List, at 
http://docket.medill.northwestern.edu/archives/000969 (last visited Nov. 2, 2005).  
Similarly, the Court has one case, Maryland v. Blake, on its docket for the 2005-06 
term concerning self-incrimination. Medill School of Journalism, supra, at 
http://docket.medill. northwestern.edu/archives/002315.php (last visited Nov. 2, 2005).  
Two of the 2003-2004 decisions significantly impacted the Fifth Amendment derivative 
evidence rule.  In Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2630, the Court held that the failure to provide 
Miranda warnings does not require suppression of non-testimonial fruits where the 
initial incriminating statement was made voluntarily.  The Patane decision reaffirmed 
the current Court’s aversion to the Fifth Amendment fruits doctrine.  See Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307-09 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446, 451-52 
(1974).  In Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613, the Court suppressed a confession obtained 
through the “question-first” interrogation technique, which involves questioning a 
suspect in successive unwarned and warned phases.  The technique creates precisely 
the type of environment that the Miranda Court found likely to impede a defendant’s 
ability to make a free and rational choice about whether to speak to the police.  Id. at 
2607.  Seibert  limited the reach of the Court’s prior holding in Oregon v. Elstad thus 
resolving a split among the Courts of Appeal.  Id. at 2607, 2611.  In Elstad, discussed 
herein, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment does not require suppression of a 
confession made after proper Miranda warnings and a voluntary waiver of rights solely 
because the police had obtained an earlier but unwarned statement from the suspect.  
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318.  Some courts had read Elstad as essentially admitting all 
subsequent confessions while other courts suppressed statements if it was clear that 
the police had deliberately evaded Miranda.  Id. at 2607.  The Seibert decision 
reinforced the constitutional status of the procedural safeguards established in 
Miranda.  Id. at 2605. 
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United States.3  There, the Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision and held that the absence of an interrogation does not 
foreclose a petitioner’s claim that his jailhouse statements 
should be suppressed as the fruits of a statement improperly 
taken from him at his home.4  Specifically, the Court found that 
the officers, who went to the accused’s home after he had been 
indicted for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, 
violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
when they deliberately elicited information from him about his 
role in the crime in the absence of counsel or a valid waiver of 
counsel.5  Since the Eighth Circuit held that the petitioner’s 
Sixth Amendment rights had not been violated, it applied Fifth 
Amendment standards to determine whether the accused’s 
inculpatory statements made at the jailhouse should be 
suppressed as the products of prior, illegally obtained 
statements.6  Typically, evidence obtained through a violation 
of a defendant’s constitutional rights cannot be admitted at 
trial.7  An established exception to the traditional exclusionary 
rule, known as the “Elstad exception,” allows derivative 
evidence8 obtained after unwarned,9 yet uncoercive 
  
 3 540 U.S. 519 (2004). 
 4 Id. at 521. 
 5 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 524-25.  
 6 Id. at 525. 
 7 The Court stated in Mapp v. Ohio: 
[A] conviction . . . the foundation of which is evidence obtained in disregard of 
liberties deemed fundamental by the Constitution, cannot stand . . . .  And 
this Court has on Constitutional grounds, set aside convictions, both in the 
federal and state courts, which were based upon confessions ‘secured by 
protracted and repeated questioning of ignorant and untutored persons in 
whose minds the power of officers was greatly magnified’ . . . or ‘who have 
been lawfully held incommunicado without advice of friends or counsel’ . . . . 
367 U.S 643, 649-51 (1961) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 339-40 
(1943)). 
 8 Derivative evidence or, more commonly, “fruits,” refers to evidence one step 
removed from illegally obtained evidence, as opposed to the evidence that resulted 
directly from a constitutional violation.  The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of 
either form of evidence.  Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1939); 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).  So, for example, 
imagine that an individual is illegally arrested and confesses.  The confession leads 
police to uncover other evidence, like a weapon, witness, or dead body.  The confession 
is primary evidence, but the subsequently discovered evidence (i.e. the weapon or the 
body) is considered derivative evidence.  As a tool to determine whether a particular 
piece of evidence derived from an initial illegality, the Court coined the metaphor “fruit 
of the poisonous tree.”  See Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341.  A prime illustration of the 
derivative evidence rule at work can be found in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471 (1963).   
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questioning10 to be used in the prosecution’s case in chief as 
long as the suspect was later advised of and waived his 
Miranda rights.11  Relying on the Elstad exception, the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to admit Fellers’ 
second statement.12 
In its review of the Fellers case, the Supreme Court 
determined that the police officers’ conduct had in fact violated 
the petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights, but the Court did not 
decide whether the exception announced in Elstad would apply 
under the circumstances—where a suspect makes 
incriminating statements after validly waiving his right to 
counsel despite earlier police questioning in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment.13  The Court remanded the case so that the 
Eighth Circuit could conduct its exclusionary analysis based on 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel violation.14  On February 
15, 2005, the Eighth Circuit, still relying on the Elstad 
exception, affirmed Fellers’ conviction once again.15   
The Eighth Circuit’s decision to introduce and apply an 
exclusionary rule exception specifically created to deal with 
violations of the Fifth Amendment to a Sixth Amendment 
violation has significant and controversial implications for the 
future of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and ultimately for 
  
 9 Once in police custody, a suspect must be informed that he has the right to 
remain silent, that anything said can be used against him at trial, and that he has a 
right to counsel.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).  The aforementioned 
rights are commonly referred to as “Miranda rights” and any statement made by a 
suspect prior to being given these warnings is considered “unwarned.”  See Id. at 468.   
 10 Non-coercive means that the suspect made the statement knowingly and 
voluntarily.  Id. at 461-62. 
 11 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308-09 (1985).  In this case, Elstad gave a 
Miranda-defective confession in his home, then received warnings at the jailhouse, 
signed a waiver, and made a formal confession.  Id. at 300-02.  His second confession, 
which would traditionally have been excluded under the fruits of the poisonous tree 
doctrine, was admitted because the Court found that the officer remedied his initial 
failure to provide Elstad with his Miranda warnings.  Id. at 308-09.  Thus the only 
remaining inquiry was whether Elstad had made a valid waiver and given an 
uncoerced confession.  See id.  The Court found that he did.  Id. at 315.   
 12 Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 525 (2004). 
 13 Id.  
 14 Id.  
 15 United States v. Fellers, 397 F.3d 1090, 1092 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Fellers 
argues that Elstad does not apply to violations of the Sixth Amendment because the 
Elstad rule was never designed to deal with actual violations of the Constitution.  In 
addition, Fellers argues that Elstad—which was crafted to serve the Fifth 
Amendment—is inapplicable because it is ill-suited to serve the distinct concerns 
raised by the Sixth Amendment and because violations of the Miranda rule are 
fundamentally different from the Sixth Amendment violation at issue in this case.  We 
disagree.”).   
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the rights of criminal defendants.  By analogizing the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, instead of distinguishing 
them, the Eighth Circuit has rejected the view of most legal 
scholars and lower courts that the right to counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment is a more protected right.  Equating the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel with the lesser-protected 
and narrower Fifth Amendment right leaves the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel susceptible to further weakening. 
The most controversial aspect of the Fellers decision is 
the exclusionary remedy that must be applied if the Sixth 
Amendment violation at issue falls outside of the Elstad 
exception.16  The exclusionary rule, a long-settled yet oft-
debated rule, requires evidence obtained in violation of a 
defendant’s constitutional rights to be excluded at trial.17  Since 
first announcing the rule, however, the Court has significantly 
narrowed the rule’s scope, citing the debatable merits of 
excluding probative evidence.18  The main way the Court has 
softened the rule’s impact is by recognizing exceptions that 
allow illegally obtained evidence and its fruits to be used at 
trial.  The exception established in Elstad severely limits the 
fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine in the Fifth Amendment 
context and the Eighth Circuit decision validating Elstad’s 
applicability in the Sixth Amendment context will have the 
same effect.  So, the issue remains: did cutting down the fruit 
of the poisonous tree growing in the Sixth Amendment orchard 
go too far?  Can the administration of Miranda warnings truly 
  
 16 See infra notes 16, 17.  
 17 It is a well-established principle that all evidence derived from a 
constitutional violation is subject to exclusion.  See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 484 (1963).  The rule has been a divisive issue since the Court first 
announced and applied it as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations in Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).  “The ongoing discussion of the merits of the 
exclusionary rule is as old as the rule itself.” Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma 
of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY 
L.J. 937, 938 (1983). 
 18 One of the rule’s most venerable critics is Justice Cardozo, who is oft 
quoted as deriding the exclusionary doctrine because it allows “[t]he criminal . . . to go 
free because the constable has blundered.”  People v. Dafore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 
1926).  Opponents are quick to point out that the exclusionary rule is wholly court 
made, i.e. there is no Constitutional language mandating exclusion.  Akhil Reed Amar, 
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 785 (1994).  Furthermore, 
the exclusionary rule differs from other rules of evidence, which are designed to 
exclude only unreliable and overly prejudicial evidence.  In contrast, the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule purposely excludes reliable evidence.  See Barnett, supra 
note 17, at 941.  Finally, opponents argue that the remedy lacks proportionality—
whether the police infraction is egregious or minor, there is the same result.  See 
Sharon L. Davies, The Penalty of Exclusion—A Price or Sanction?, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1275, 1318 (2000). 
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sanitize the fruits of a Sixth Amendment violation or is 
equating Miranda to the Sixth Amendment like comparing 
apples to oranges?  
This Comment argues that the Eighth Circuit erred in 
applying the Elstad exception to the Fellers case because a 
Miranda warning simply is not enough to remedy a Sixth 
Amendment violation even if it is sufficient to protect the Fifth 
Amendment entitlement to counsel.  The Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel’s genesis, purpose, and Supreme Court 
jurisprudence have accorded it a higher degree of protection 
than its Fifth Amendment counterpart.  Moreover, the Sixth 
Amendment exclusionary rule, as opposed to the Fifth 
Amendment exclusionary rule, is a personal right that is 
inextricably tied to the promise of counsel.  As such, the rule 
serves a purpose other than deterrence; it is meant to 
underscore and reinforce the right.  Given the nature of the 
Sixth Amendment right, application of fruits principles 
requires suppression of any evidence that is derived from a 
violation of that right.  This Comment also asserts that, in 
general, the Elstad exception is not one that should be 
extended into the Sixth Amendment realm, but rather limited 
to the Fifth Amendment context.  Allowing the government to 
use evidence derived from an inculpatory statement, voluntary 
or not, made in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, substantially undermines the Amendment’s 
protections.  Any weakening of the right to assistance of 
counsel essentially renders a defendant’s right to a fair trial an 
empty one.  Yet it is the ability to ensure a fair trial for all 
defendants that is the foundation of our entire criminal justice 
system and that without which our system loses all integrity.  
As the facts of Fellers demonstrate, this slippery slope 
argument is not merely theoretical hypothesizing, but an 
unsettling reality. 
Part II of this Comment explains the backgrounds of 
Oregon v. Elstad and United States v. Fellers.  Part III explores 
the differences between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights 
to counsel, including their purposes, waiver requirements, and 
violations.  Part IV sketches a history of the exclusionary rule 
and its application in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment 
contexts and traces the development of the derivative-evidence 
rule.  Part V examines the Court’s decision in Fellers v. United 
States and distinguishes it from the facts and reasoning of 
Oregon v. Elstad.  Finally, Part VI concludes that the Elstad 
exception is inapplicable in a Sixth Amendment context and 
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asserts that while the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to 
counsel sometimes overlap, they have fundamentally different 
functions that are important to distinguish, and therefore, the 
rights cannot and should not be equated as a per se rule.   
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Facts of Elstad 
After a home was burglarized in Polk County, Oregon, 
the police received a tip implicating Michael Elstad, the next 
door neighbor.19  Two officers went to Elstad’s home with a 
warrant for his arrest.20  Elstad’s mother answered the door, let 
the officers in and brought them to her son’s room where he 
was lying on his bed listening to the radio.21  The officers asked 
Elstad to go into the living room with them.22  Thereafter, one 
officer took Mrs. Elstad into the kitchen to explain the state of 
affairs while the other officer remained in the living room with 
Michael Elstad.23  The officer asked him if he knew why the 
officers were there.  Elstad responded, “no.”24  The officer then 
asked if he knew a person named Gross.25  Elstad replied that 
he knew Gross and that he had heard there was a burglary at 
the Gross home.26  The officer then told Elstad that he believed 
Elstad was involved in that burglary.27  Elstad responded, “Yes, 
I was there.”28  The officers then arrested Elstad and took him 
to the police station.29  Approximately one hour later, while at 
the police station, the police informed Elstad of his Miranda 
rights.30  Elstad indicated that he understood those rights and 
wanted to speak with the officers.31  He then proceeded to give 
a full statement, typed and signed by Elstad and both officers, 
explaining his role in the robbery.32 
  
 19 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 300 (1985). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 300-01. 
 24 Id. at 301. 
 25 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301. 
 32 Id. 
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Elstad was charged with first-degree burglary and tried 
by a Circuit Court judge.33  He moved to suppress his oral 
statement and signed confession, arguing that the statement 
he had made in response to questioning at his house tainted his 
subsequent confession because it “let the cat out of the bag.”34  
The lower court refused to suppress the second written 
statement, however, because Elstad had made it freely, 
voluntarily, and knowingly and after a valid waiver of his 
Miranda rights.35  Elstad was found guilty.  He appealed his 
conviction, but the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed it.36 
B. The Facts of Fellers 
On February 24, 2000, a grand jury indicted Fellers for 
conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.37  Two officers, 
Sergeant Michael Garnett and Sheriff Jeff Bliemeister, went to 
the defendant’s home in Lincoln, Nebraska to arrest him.38  
When Fellers answered the door, the two officers identified 
themselves and asked if they could come in.39  Fellers invited 
the officers into his home, and they advised him that they had 
come to discuss his involvement in methamphetamine 
distribution.40  They also informed Fellers that he had been 
indicted and that the indictment referred to his involvement 
with four individuals, whom they then named.41  Fellers told 
the officers that he knew those individuals and had used drugs 
with them.42  After approximately fifteen minutes, the officers 
took the defendant to the county jail.43  At the jailhouse, the 
officers informed Fellers of his Miranda rights for the first 
time.44  Fellers waived his rights, signed a waiver form, and 
proceeded to reiterate the inculpatory statements he had made 
in his home.45 
  
 33 Id. at 302. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 300. 
 37 Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 521 (2004). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 521. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 521-22. 
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Before trial, Fellers moved to suppress the inculpatory 
statements he made in his home and at the jail.46  A magistrate 
judge recommended that the statements be suppressed because 
the officers had failed to read the defendant his Miranda rights 
in the home, thus making the jailhouse statements fruits of 
this prior violation.47  The District Court, however, suppressed 
the unwarned statements Fellers made at his house, but 
admitted the jailhouse statements made later pursuant to the 
Elstad exception.  The court reasoned that Fellers had 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before 
making the statements.48  Fellers was convicted at trial. 
On appeal, Fellers argued that the jailhouse statements 
should have been suppressed as fruits of the statements 
obtained in his home in violation of his Sixth Amendment 
rights.49  The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, 
concluding that the officers did not violate Fellers’ Sixth 
Amendment rights because the officers’ questions at his home 
did not amount to an interrogation, and therefore, the district 
court properly admitted the jailhouse statements under 
Elstad.50   
III. FIFTH VERSUS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO COUNSEL 
The issue the Supreme Court left open in Fellers is 
whether the Elstad exception, which the Eighth Circuit applied 
to a procedural Miranda violation, also applies in the context of 
a Sixth Amendment violation.  In order to analyze this 
question, it is essential to understand the main differences 
between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel and 
their respective exclusionary rules.  The following section 
discusses the sources of, rationales behind, and requisites for 
compliance with each Amendment. 
  
 46 Id. at 522. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 522. 
 50 Id. at 522-23. 
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A. The Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel 
1. Purpose 
The Fifth Amendment right to counsel furthers the goal 
of assuring trustworthy evidence by ensuring that a suspect is 
guarded from the pressures of self-incrimination during police 
questioning.51  Notably, though, the Fifth Amendment does not 
specifically refer to the entitlement to legal counsel.52  However, 
in Miranda v. Arizona,53 the Court found an independent 
source for the right to counsel within the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.54  Concerned with ensuring 
reliable—meaning uncoerced—jailhouse confessions, the Court 
held that prior to any custodial questioning, a suspect must be 
warned of his right to counsel, among others.55  The Court 
believed that this warning was necessary to combat the 
“inherently compelling pressures” present at an in-custody 
interrogation—pressures that inevitably heighten the risk that 
an individual will feel compelled to incriminate himself.56  The 
Court described the primary ways that the presence of counsel 
at an interrogation helps the accused: an attorney can (i) 
mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness, (ii) reduce police 
coercion, and (iii) guarantee the accuracy of the accused’s 
statement.57  Thus, the core protection of the Fifth Amendment 
is the right against self-incrimination, not the right to 
assistance of counsel.58  Assistance of counsel in this context is 
an ancillary measure designed to protect the broader right by 
providing a buffer between the accused and the often coercive 
  
 51 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985). 
 52 Rather, the Fifth Amendment states that no person “shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 53 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Miranda was a group of consolidated cases in which 
the Court determined the admissibility of self-incriminating statements obtained from 
defendants questioned while in custody, but without an effective warning of their 
rights at the outset of the interrogation process.  The Court held that the prosecution 
may not use statements, exculpatory or inculpatory, obtained from custodial 
interrogation of the defendant “unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards 
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”  Id. at 444. 
 54 See id. at 469. 
 55 Id. at 476. 
 56 Id. at 467. 
 57 Id. at 470.   
 58 The right to have counsel present at the interrogation, the Court wrote, is 
“indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege.”  Id. at 469. 
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forces of an interrogation by government officials that might 
force a suspect to confess his guilt.59   
2. When the Right Attaches 
The right applies in a very limited setting.  In order to 
invoke the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, a suspect must 
be in custody60 and under interrogation.61  As the Miranda court 
stressed, it is the confluence of these two factors that makes 
counsel’s compulsion-dispelling presence, or at least the right 
to ask for it, essential.62   
3. Waiver 
A defendant may waive his Miranda rights, as long as 
he does so “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.”63  Once a 
suspect invokes his right to counsel, however, the 
interrogation, no matter what point it is at, must cease until 
the suspect has had an opportunity to confer with an attorney.64  
Any statement taken after a suspect requests counsel is 
presumed to be coerced and is inadmissible at trial.65  In order 
to rebut the presumption of coercion, the Miranda Court stated 
that the government has the “heavy burden” of demonstrating 
  
 59 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000); Duckeworth v. 
Egan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987); New 
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653-54 (1974); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-70 
(1966). 
 60 A suspect is in custody when his freedom of action is curtailed in any 
significant way.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.  See also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 
420, 441 (1984) (admitting inculpatory statements made after the defendant’s car was 
pulled over because the initial stop of the car did not place the defendant in custody). 
 61 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (defining interrogation as initiated 
questioning by the police after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of their freedom in some significant way); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 
299-301 (1980) (broadening definition of interrogation set forth in Miranda to include 
situations where there is no express questioning, but psychological persuasion that 
results in a suspect making inculpatory statements). 
 62 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.  It is important to note that being questioned at 
a police station does not necessarily mean that someone is in custody.  Oregon v. 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).  Likewise, answering questions in a police station 
while in custody does not necessarily constitute interrogation.  Arizona v. Mauro, 481 
U.S. 520, 527 (1987).  Both are fact specific inquiries. 
 63 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.  Here, the Court imported the Sixth Amendment 
waiver standard announced in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), which 
established a high threshold for demonstrating a waiver of constitutional rights.   
 64 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966). 
 65 Id. at 474 (explaining that once a defendant has indicated his desire to 
exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege, any subsequent statement “cannot be other 
than an act of compulsion, subtle or otherwise”). 
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that a suspect knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege 
against self-incrimination and his right to counsel.66   
While ostensibly applying this exacting standard, in 
practice the Court has actually employed a low standard for 
waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel.67  In general, 
the Court’s jurisprudence has indicated that providing suspects 
with Miranda warnings and obtaining a waiver is a “virtual 
ticket of admissibility.”68  The Court has even noted that cases 
in which a defendant can legitimately argue that his statement 
was compelled despite receiving Miranda warnings are rare.69  
This is because the Court equates “knowing and intelligent” 
with simple “awareness” and not necessarily true 
“informedness.”70  A suspect is considered aware of his rights as 
soon as the warning is read.71  Additionally, while the burden 
rests with the state to prove a voluntary and knowing waiver, 
the Court has held that it can do so without evidence of express 
relinquishment.72 
4. Violations  
When considering whether the government has violated 
a suspect’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the inquiry 
focuses on whether the suspect felt coerced, not whether the 
police acted in an intentionally coercive manner.73  Thus, in 
  
 66 Id. at 475 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 & n.14 (1964); 
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (1938)). 
 67 Meredith B. Halama, Note, Loss of a Fundamental Right: The Sixth 
Amendment as a Mere “Prophylactic Rule,” 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1207, 1217.  See also 
James J. Tomkovicz, Standards for Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession 
Contexts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 975, 1045 (1986). 
 68 Missouri v. Siebert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2608 (2004). 
 69 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984). 
 70 The Court does not require states to provide a suspect with all the 
information that may be useful in making his decision.  Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 
412, 422-23 (1985) (holding that a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel was 
not violated when police failed to inform him that a lawyer was calling the station 
trying to contact him).  Police are not required to “supply a suspect with a flow of 
information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or 
stand by his rights.”  Id. at 422.  See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316 (1985); United 
States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977).   
 71 Halama, supra note 67, at 1217. 
 72 North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1979) (holding that 
“express written or oral statement of waiver . . . is usually strong proof of the validity of 
that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver,” at 
least in some cases waiver can be inferred from the actions and words of the person 
interrogated). 
 73 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482-83, 487 (1981); Rhode Island v. 
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966). Most 
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Miranda, the Court found the “salient characteristics” of a 
coercive atmosphere to be the incommunicado interrogation of 
individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere resulting in self-
incriminating statements without full warnings of 
constitutional rights.74  In such a situation, suspects are subject 
to many psychological pressures that could overcome their 
desire not to speak with the police.75 
While the Miranda doctrine appears to protect a 
defendant in any situation in which the police exert pressure 
on him, in actuality the Court has narrowed this construction 
significantly.  In Rhode Island v. Innis, the police, while 
transporting Innis to prison after he had invoked his right to 
counsel, engaged in a supplicant conversation about the case in 
front of him.76  Specifically, the officers said that they hoped a 
handicapped child from a nearby school would not find Innis’ 
discarded weapon and get hurt.77  After hearing this 
conversation, Innis asked the officers to return to the scene of 
the crime so that he could show them the weapon because he 
too feared that a child would get hurt.78  Despite the presence of 
the exact type of psychological ploy that the Miranda Court 
had cautioned against, the Court held that the incriminating 
evidence was properly admitted at trial.79  The Court explained 
that the conversation between the two officers was not an 
interrogation because it was not directed at Innis, and they 
could not reasonably have known that Innis would have been 
susceptible to such an appeal of conscience.80  Despite its 
  
recently, in Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2611, the Court, struck down the 
question-first method of interrogation, i.e. purposely questioning a suspect in 
successive unwarned and warned phases, because  
a suspect would hardly think he had a genuine right to remain silent, let 
alone persist in so believing once the police began to lead him over the same 
ground [of his earlier, unwarned confession] again.  A more likely reaction on 
a suspect’s part would be perplexity about the reason for discussing rights at 
that point, bewilderment being an unpromising frame of mind for 
knowledgeable decision. 
Id. at *25. 
 74 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.   
 75 Id. at 448-49. 
 76 446 U.S. 291, 294 (1980). 
 77 Id. at 294-95. 
 78 Id. at 295. 
 79 Id. at 302. 
 80 Id.  The Court clarified the definition of interrogation as any police action 
that the police should know is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.  Id. 
at 298-302.   
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constrictive holding in Innis, the Court in Edwards v. Arizona81 
made clear that once a suspect has invoked his Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel, all questioning must cease unless 
initiated by the suspect himself.82  A suspect’s responses to 
further questioning after an invocation of the right to counsel 
cannot be used to cast doubt on that request.83  
The most distinctive attribute of a Miranda violation, 
however, is that the Court has held that the unintentional 
failure to read Miranda is not a direct violation of the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.84  Rather, this 
failure merely creates a rebuttable presumption of coercion.85  
The Miranda Court itself explained that the warning was not a 
“constitutional straightjacket” and invited the legislature to 
develop equally effective ways to protect the Fifth Amendment 
privilege.86  The Court’s initial characterization of Miranda 
provided the opportunity for more conservative courts to cut 
back significantly on Miranda’s protections by creating 
multiple exceptions to when the rule actually applies.87  Each 
time the Court found a way around Miranda, it justified the 
  
 81 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
 82 Id. at 484-85.  
 83 Id. at 484; Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 100 (1984) (stating that “an 
accused’s postrequest responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast 
retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request itself”).  
 84 See United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2628 (2004); Missouri v. 
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2603 (2004); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772 (2003); 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440 n.6 (2000).  See also Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (“[W]hen an individual is taken into custody . . . and is 
subjected to questioning . . . [p]rocedural safeguards must be employed to protect the 
privilege [against self-incrimination] and unless other fully effective means are adopted 
to notify the person of his right[s,] . . . [reading Miranda is] required.”).  
 85 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985). 
 86 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.  The legislature took up the Court’s offer shortly 
thereafter and enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, discussed herein, but the Court overruled the 
Act in 2000.  See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444. 
 87 See e.g., Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2626 (failing to provide a suspect with 
Miranda warnings does not require suppression of physical fruits of the suspect’s 
unwarned by voluntary statements); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458-59 
(1994) (holding that police officers are free to interrogate a Mirandized suspect until 
that suspect makes an explicit request for counsel); Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308 (refusing to 
employ derivative-evidence rule for a procedural violation of Miranda); New York v. 
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (establishing the public safety exception); Oregon 
v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1980) (expanding impeachment exception to include 
voluntary responses made after assistance of counsel had been requested); Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 436, 444-45 (1974) (holding that the failure to inform defendant 
that counsel will be appointed is not a sufficient enough departure to establish 
compulsion); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1971) (establishing the 
impeachment exception). 
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decision by categorizing Miranda as merely a “prophylactic” 
rule.88   
The Court’s continuous pairing down of Miranda 
protections came to a head in 2000, when a long-ignored 
federal law enacted shortly after the Miranda decision came 
down was finally challenged.89  18 U.S.C. § 3501 provided a 
statutory circumvention of Miranda by reinstating the 
voluntariness standard, which was used prior to Miranda, as 
the test for admissibility of confessions.90  In Dickerson v. 
United States., the Court seemed to have only two apparent 
choices: hold that in fact the Miranda safeguards are not 
constitutionally guaranteed or reject all of the exceptions that 
had been established on the basis that the Miranda safeguards 
are simply prophylactic.  In a surprising and somewhat circular 
opinion, the Rehnquist Court threw Miranda a life-vest of 
sorts.  The Court held that Miranda is a “constitutional 
decision” that cannot be overruled by legislative activity.91  At 
the same time, however, the Court upheld all of the previously 
established exceptions to the exclusionary rule.92  In so doing, 
the Court did not reject previous articulations that Miranda’s 
protections reach broader than the Fifth Amendment right 
itself.93  Therefore any further extensions of its protections 
  
 88 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305 (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444); Quarles, 467 
U.S. at 657.  See also Hass, 420 U.S. at 721 (noting that “the shield provided by 
Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury” (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 
226) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 89 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428. 
 90 18 U.S.C. § 3501.  Under section (b)(3) of the statute, the reading of 
Miranda warnings was considered only one factor in the voluntariness determination.  
Id. 
 91 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. 
 92 See id. at 441(explaining that subsequent “decisions illustrate the 
principle–not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule–but that no constitutional rule 
is immutable”). 
 93 See id. at 446 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the majority did not 
go as far as to say that the Fifth Amendment is violated when a statement obtained in 
violation of Miranda is admitted against the accused, but rather ambiguously referred 
to Miranda as “constitutionally based,” having “constitutional underpinnings,” and a 
“constitutional decision”).  See also United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2627 
(2004) (citing Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 778 (2003) (stating that “[b]ut because 
these prophylactic rules (including the Miranda rule) necessarily sweep beyond the 
actual protections of the Self-Incrimination Clause . . . any further extension of these 
rules must be justified by its necessity for the protection of the actual right against 
compelled self-incrimination . . .”)); Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306 (stating that “[t]he Miranda 
exclusionary rule . . . sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself”).   
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must be tied closely to the underlying Fifth Amendment 
privilege.94   
B. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
1. Purpose 
The right to counsel in the Sixth Amendment context 
serves two main purposes: (i) to minimize the imbalance 
created in an adversarial system where laymen are prosecuted 
by a government trained and committed to doing so and (ii) to 
maintain the fairness and integrity of criminal trials.95  In 
contrast to the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment 
explicitly provides for the right to counsel.  The Sixth 
Amendment states in part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence.”96  The main principles underlying the 
entire Amendment are “the protection of innocence and the 
pursuit of truth,” which has led many legal scholars to describe 
the Sixth Amendment as “the heartland of constitutional 
criminal procedure.”97  In Powell v. Alabama, the Court 
elaborated on the undeniably important role that the right to 
counsel plays in the American criminal adversarial system.98  
The Court held that the right to counsel is a fundamental right, 
explaining that the right to be heard—essentially the right to a 
fair trial—is an empty one without the right to assistance of 
counsel.99  Thus, the Sixth Amendment serves a different, 
  
 94 “If errors are made by law enforcement in administering the prophylactic 
Miranda procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable consequences as 
police infringement on the Fifth Amendment itself.”  Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309. 
 95 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S 159, 168-70 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967); Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
 96 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 97 Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 
641-42 (1996). 
 98 287 U.S. at 66-69. 
 99 Id.  In reaching its decision, the Court expounded on why legal expertise is 
essential in this sort of system:  
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill 
in the science of law.  If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of 
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad.  He is 
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence.  Left without the aid of counsel he may 
be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent 
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.  He 
lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even 
though he have a perfect one.  He requires the guiding hand of counsel at 
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arguably more important, function than its Fifth Amendment 
counterpart.100  Here, the right serves as a remedy for the 
imbalance created when ill-equipped defendants must face an 
organized prosecutorial machine.101  Counsel equalizes the field 
by providing legal knowledge, skills, and training and by 
committing himself to putting the accused’s best interests 
first.102 
2. When the Right Attaches 
The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment is 
broad.103  Two threshold requirements must be met before the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches: (i) initiation of 
adversarial proceedings104 and (ii) deliberate governmental 
elicitation of statements.105  A suspect need not be in custody or 
feel coerced to trigger the right.106  It is enough that the 
individual has been indicted and that government officials 
attempt to obtain information from him.107  While a literal 
  
every step in the proceedings against him.  Without it, though he be not 
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to 
establish his innocence. 
Id. at 69 (emphasis added). 
 100 Thomas Echikson, Sixth Amendment–Waiver After Request for Counsel, 77 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 783 (1986).  Despite the Powell Court’s clear 
endorsement of the indispensable nature of the right to assistance of counsel, such a 
requirement did not apply to the states until nearly thirty years later when Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), extended the Sixth Amendment right to state courts 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.   
 101 See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45 (citing Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69); Johnson 
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938). 
 102 See Tomkovicz, supra note 66, at 981. 
 103 While this section asserts that the Sixth Amendment right is broader than 
that of the Fifth, it is also important to note the two ways in which the Court has 
narrowed the Sixth Amendment right.  First, in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 
(1991), the Court held that a defendant who invoked the right to counsel at a bail 
hearing did not simultaneously invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.  Then, in 
Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001), the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel is offense specific and cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions, 
meaning that the police can question represented defendants about other uncharged 
crimes outside the presence of counsel. 
 104 United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984). 
 105 United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 
U.S. 387, 436-38 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
 106 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206. 
 107 While the Court has held that using wired informants, Massiah, 377 U.S. 
at 201, 204, or orchestrated jailhouse situations, Henry, 447 U.S. at 123-24, designed to 
elicit information from the defendant triggers the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 
neither of these situations would meet the definition of custodial interrogation and 
thus not trigger the attachment of the Fifth Amendment right.  See supra notes 61, 78.  
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reading of the Amendment’s text suggests that defendants are 
only guaranteed counsel at their actual trial, the Powell Court 
expanded the protection’s scope;108 it now attaches at the 
initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether 
by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, 
information, or arraignment—when a defendant needs the aid 
of counsel most.109   
In United States v. Wade,110 the Court explained that a 
broad application of the right to counsel was necessary because 
(i) the Framers of the Bill of Rights had envisioned a broader 
role for counsel then what had been the prevailing practice in 
England and (ii) since then, criminal prosecutions have evolved 
significantly.111  The Court also considered how trials have 
evolved.  Whereas at one time evidence against the accused 
was accumulated at the trial itself, currently, the bulk of the 
evidence against the defendant is gathered in pretrial 
proceedings.  This significant change allows the results of 
pretrial proceedings to potentially “settle the accused’s 
fate . . . reduc[ing] the trial itself to a mere formality.”112  The 
Wade Court made clear that despite the plain wording of the 
Sixth Amendment, the basic meaning of the Amendment 
  
 108 The Powell Court justified its expansion of the right by explaining that the 
right to counsel at trial is effectively meaningless if its protections can be undone by 
events that occur before trial.  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
 109 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (explaining that the point at 
which the system changes from investigatory to accusatorial is “far from a mere 
formalism,” it is rather the point at which the adverse positions of the government and 
defendant have solidified); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 325 (1959) (pointing out 
that depriving a formally charged defendant “of counsel during the period prior to trial 
may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the trial itself”); Powell, 287 U.S. 
at 57 (noting that the defendants had been deprived of the right to counsel during the 
most critical period of the proceedings: “from the time of their arraignment until the 
beginning of their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and 
preparation [are] vitally important”). 
 110 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (holding that a post-indictment line-up was a critical 
confrontation by the prosecution for which the defendant was entitled to the assistance 
of counsel).   
 111 Id. at 224. 
When the Bill of Rights was adopted, there were no organized police forces as 
we know them today.  The accused confronted the prosecutor and the 
witnesses against him, and the evidence was marshaled, largely at the trial 
itself.  In contrast, today’s law enforcement machinery involves critical 
confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at [crucial] pretrial 
proceedings . . . . 
Id.  
 112 Id. 
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guarantees the right to assistance of counsel whenever it is 
necessary to ensure a meaningful defense.113 
The right to counsel, as defined, applies to all critical 
stages114 of a prosecution,115 and the Court presumes that a 
defendant requests counsel at all of these stages.116  Once the 
right to counsel has attached, the government must honor it, 
which means that the government must do more than simply 
not prevent an accused from obtaining assistance of counsel.117  
Rather, the State has an affirmative obligation to “respect and 
preserve” the accused’s choice to seek counsel’s assistance.118  
Building on this principle, the Court has held that once the 
right to assistance of counsel attaches, it is of such importance 
that the police may no longer employ techniques for eliciting 
information from an uncounseled defendant that might have 
been completely proper at an earlier stage of investigation.119 
3. Waiver 
As previously noted, the Court places a high premium 
on waivers of Constitutional rights.120  In Johnson v. Zerbst, the 
  
 113 Id. at 225. 
 114 An event is defined as critical if the presence of counsel is “necessary to 
preserve the defendant’s basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right . . . to have 
effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself.”  Id. at 227.  Post-indictment line-ups 
and post-indictment questioning have both been held to be “critical stages” of a 
prosecution because of the irreversible potential for prejudice that could result to the 
defendant without having his counsel present.  Wade, 388 U.S. at 232; Massiah v. 
United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964) (citing Spano, 360 U.S. at 326).  On the other 
hand, a post-indictment photographic line-up has been held not to be a critical stage of 
the prosecution.  United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973). 
 115 Wade, 388 U.S. at 224.  See also Powell, 287 U.S. at 57 (citing People ex rel. 
Burgess v. Riseley, 66 How. Pr. 67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1883); Batchelor v. State, 125 N.E. 
773 (Ind. 1920)). 
 116 Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986). 
 117 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170-71 (1985). 
 118 Id.  The Court went on to say that this means “at the very least, the 
prosecutor and police have an affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that 
circumvents . . . the protection afforded by the right to counsel.”  Id. at 171. 
 119 Jackson, 475 U.S. at 626, 631 (considering the question of whether the 
police can question a defendant further after he requested counsel at arraignment, but 
has not yet had the opportunity to consult with counsel, and noting that the reasons for 
prohibiting interrogation of an uncounseled prisoner who asked for help are even 
stronger after he has been formally charged).  
 120 “[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights and we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of 
fundamental rights.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (quoting Aetna Ins. 
Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)); Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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Court laid out an exacting standard for waiver of Sixth 
Amendment rights—the “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary” 
standard, which depends on a case-by-case analysis of the 
surrounding facts and circumstances of the case, including “the 
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”121  
Following Zerbst, some lower courts, and even two Supreme 
Court Justices—albeit in dissents—held that waiver of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel required a higher threshold 
than waiver of the Fifth Amendment right, despite the fact 
that the Court used the same standard to describe both.122   
The Court has never directly answered this question, 
but appeared to somewhat strike down the idea of different 
standards when it held that the Miranda warning is sufficient 
to advise indicted defendants, who have not invoked their right 
to counsel, of the right and the consequences of relinquishing 
it.123  The Court based its decision on the fact that an attorney 
plays essentially the same role in post-indictment questioning 
as an attorney at a custodial interrogation; therefore, it should 
not be more difficult to waive one right than the other.  The 
majority stressed, however, that there are limited situations in 
which a valid waiver might be found under Miranda but not 
under the Sixth Amendment, such as where an attorney was 
attempting to contact his client or a surreptitious conversation 
  
 121 Id. at 464. 
 122 Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 307(1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(describing majority’s opinion that the Miranda warning makes clear to the accused 
how counsel could advise him as a “gross understatement of the disadvantage of 
proceeding without a lawyer” and therefore insufficient basis upon which to make a 
knowing and intelligent waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Wyrick v. 
Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 55 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting), reh’g denied, 464 U.S. 1020 
(1984) (advocating a higher standard for Sixth Amendment waiver); Felder v. 
McCotter, 765 F.2d 1245, 1250 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that “a waiver of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel requires more than a recital of Miranda rights . . .”), 
abrogated by Patterson, 487 U.S. 285; United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 380 (5th 
Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984) (stating that because the policies 
underlying the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel are quite distinct, so too 
are the waiver requirements); United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585, 589 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(holding that the Miranda warning is not sufficient to waive the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel); United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1147 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding 
that there is “a higher standard with respect to waiver of the right to counsel that 
applies when the Sixth Amendment attaches”); United States v. Satterfield, 588 F.2d 
655, 657 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating that there is a higher waiver standard that applies to 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); United States v. Callabrass, 458 F. Supp. 964, 
967 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (following the Satterfield holding that more than Miranda 
warnings are needed to inform an indicted defendant about his right to counsel); 
United States v. Miller, 432 F. Supp. 382, 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (noting that statements 
“which are voluntary under the Fifth Amendment are not necessarily valid when 
viewed against the higher standard of waiver implicit in the Sixth Amendment”). 
 123 Patterson, 487 U.S. at 292-93. 
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between an undercover officer and an indicted defendant.124  
Once a defendant invokes his right to counsel, however, any 
secret interrogation of the defendant without counsel present 
contravenes the fundamental rights of a person charged with a 
crime and any subsequent waiver during police-initiated 
questioning is invalid.125 
4. Violations 
When considering violations of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel, the Court focuses on the actions of the police 
as opposed to the perceptions of the accused.126  The current 
approach to Sixth Amendment right to counsel violations came 
down in Massiah v. United States,127 in which the Court 
emphasized the difference between the “deliberate elicitation 
standard”128 and the “functional equivalent of interrogation”129 
concept.130  Massiah was indicted for violating federal narcotics 
laws.131  He retained a lawyer, pleaded not guilty, and was 
released on bail.132  While out on bail, federal agents obtained 
incriminating statements from Massiah by installing a 
recording device in his co-defendant’s car.133  The Supreme 
Court reversed Massiah’s conviction, holding that the 
  
 124 In contrast, under a Fifth Amendment analysis there would be a valid 
waiver in both situations.  Id. at 296 n.9.   
 125 Here the Court imports the reasoning of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 
(1981), concluding that the “reasons for prohibiting the interrogation of an uncounseled 
prisoner are even stronger after he has been formally charged with an offense than 
before.”  Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 631 (1986).  
 126 Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 524 (2004) (questioning an indicted 
defendant in his home about the crime in question is deliberate elicitation); Maine v. 
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985) (excluding statements obtained through a wired co-
defendant); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270, 274-75 (1980) (incriminating 
statements suppressed where defendant made them to a jailhouse plant because the 
government’s specific mention of defendant to the undercover informant, who was paid 
on a contingency fee basis, constituted the prohibited type of affirmative steps to secure 
incriminating information from a defendant outside the presence of counsel); Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 402-04 (1977) (appealing to a particular defendant’s proclivities 
or weaknesses constitutes deliberate elicitation); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 
201, 206 (1964) (excluding statements obtained unbeknownst to the defendant through 
his wired co-defendant). 
 127 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
 128 This is the Sixth Amendment right to counsel trigger.  See id. at 204. 
 129 Used to determine Miranda violations.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 476 (1966). 
 130 377 U.S. at 206. 
 131 Id. at 202. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 202-03.  
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government could not constitutionally use the defendant’s own 
incriminating words that were deliberately and unknowingly 
elicited in the absence of counsel against him.134 
The Massiah doctrine laid essentially dormant until 
nearly thirteen years later in Brewer v. Williams.135  Williams 
was suspected of abducting a little girl.136  He retained counsel, 
who advised him that the officers would transport him to 
another city and that no interrogation would take place, but 
that if it did, he should not respond until he consulted with an 
attorney.137  While being transported, an officer, knowing that 
the defendant was schizophrenic and highly religious, began to 
discuss how a snowstorm was on the way, which would make it 
nearly impossible to recover the body and allow her parents to 
give her a proper Christian burial.138  Williams then led police 
to the body.139  The Court excluded Williams’ incriminating 
statements because the police officer had deliberately elicited 
the statements from the defendant in absence of counsel or a 
waiver of counsel.140   
C. Two Very Different Rights—Comparing Apples to 
Oranges 
As the previous discussion intimates, the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment rights to counsel are truly two different 
rights.  The rights have different histories, bases, rationales, 
and purposes.  Such differences cannot be ignored.  “Analysis of 
issues and development of workable doctrine concerning the 
two entitlements must heed the differences in origin, character, 
and purpose.”141  The Sixth Amendment right to counsel was 
  
 134 Id. at 206.  In reaching its decision, the Court relied heavily on a 
concurring opinion in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).  In Spano, the Court 
reversed a state criminal conviction because a confession had been wrongly admitted 
into evidence against the defendant at his trial.  Id. at 321.  The Court decided the case 
under the Fourteenth Amendment because of the circumstances under which the 
confession had been obtained.  Massiah, 377 U.S. at 321.  But, four Justices agreed 
that the conviction should be reversed solely because the defendant had been indicted 
and his confession deliberately elicited by police in absence of counsel, thereby 
violating the Sixth Amendment.  See id. at 324-25 (Douglas, J., concurring); Id. at 326 
(Stewart, J., concurring).  
 135 430 U.S. 387 (1977). 
 136 Id. at 390. 
 137 Id. at 391. 
 138 Id. at 392-93. 
 139 Id. at 393. 
 140 Id. at 397-99. 
 141 Tomkovicz, supra note 66, at 993. 
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included in the Bill of Rights and has been part of our justice 
system for over 200 years.142  The purpose of the Amendment is 
to preserve the adversarial nature of the criminal justice 
system by ensuring fairness for the defendant and does so by 
providing attorneys as zealous advocates of the defendant’s 
best interests.  In contrast, the Court created the Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel thirty years ago.  Its purpose is to 
preserve the accusatorial nature of the criminal justice system, 
and it does so by allowing counsel to act as a medium between 
the government and the defendant in a very limited context. 
It is not just legal scholars that acknowledge these 
differences or find them important; the Court has recognized 
these critical differences as well.143  While the Court has at 
times appeared to blend the two doctrines, such a conclusion is 
the result of a superficial reading of the overlap in relevant 
case law.144  The Court has imported rationales from one 
context to the other, but before applying such rationales, the 
Court carefully considers the distinct purpose and objective of 
each right to counsel to assure that the line of thinking is 
applicable.145  In so doing, the Court has demonstrated that the 
  
 142 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
 143 See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980) (clarifying that the 
definitions of interrogation under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are not necessarily 
interchangeable since the policies underlying the two constitutional protections are 
“quite distinct”); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 282 n.6 (Blackmun, J. 
dissenting) (justifying his rejection of an objective standard for determining deliberate 
elicitation under Massiah by noting the “quite distinct” policies underlying the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 n.4)); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 
U.S. 171, 178 (1991) (stating that the guarantees of right to counsel protect “quite 
different” interests); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (explaining that the 
Sixth Amendment provides a right to counsel in a broader sense—when there is no 
interrogation and no Fifth Amendment applicability).  See also Kirby v. Illinois, 406 
U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (finding that Miranda and Massiah exclusionary rules stem from 
“quite different” constitutional guarantees). 
 144 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (importing the Sixth 
Amendment waiver standard); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986) 
(importing bright line rule established in Fifth Amendment context that once a suspect 
invokes the right to counsel, the interrogation must cease and cannot begin again 
unless the suspect initiates conversation); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296 
(1988) (finding that the Miranda warning is sufficient to provide the accused with 
enough information to waive his Fifth or Sixth Amendment right to counsel knowingly 
and intelligently). 
 145 See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 631 (rejecting the government’s argument that 
the underlying legal principles of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments make the rule 
announced in Edwards inapplicable in this case and noting that the average person 
does not appreciate the differences between the two rights to counsel and that the 
importance of the right to counsel makes the reasoning of Edwards even more 
applicable in the Sixth Amendment context); Patterson, 487 U.S. at 293-94 & n.6 
(announcing that the Miranda warning serves to sufficiently advise defendant of his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but the Court limited its decision solely to the post-
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two counsel entitlements can in no way be equated as a per se 
rule.  In fact, the Court’s analysis in the Miranda-line of cases 
has illustrated that the two rights are anything but equal.  In 
announcing the Fifth Amendment right to counsel as a “mere 
prophylactic rule,” the Court has left the right particularly 
susceptible to judicial weakening.146  The exceptions already 
carved out of the rule have caused many scholars to argue that 
Miranda has essentially become a hollow right.147  In 
reaffirming Miranda’s counsel entitlement as prophylactic and 
validating all its current exceptions in 2004, the Court has 
demonstrated its support for treating Miranda as a lesser-
protected right.148  In contrast, the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel has been expounded as a fundamental right.149  Instead 
of contracting its protections, the Court has expanded them 
from its original context at trial150 to preliminary hearings,151 
sentencings,152 identification sessions,153 initial appearances,154 
arraignments,155 and post-indictment questioning.156   
IV. FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE 
Criminal procedure requires discussion and analysis of 
two inter-related topics: the actual substantive constitutional 
right at issue and the consequence—exclusion—that occurs as 
a result of violations of that right.157  Exclusion of evidence and, 
conversely, restrictions on exclusion, depend upon the 
  
indictment context where counsel’s roles under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are 
synonymous). 
 146 Subsequent decisions have weakened Miranda’s protections.  See infra note 
86. 
 147 See, e.g., Conor G. Bateman, Dickerson v. United States: Miranda is 
Deemed a Constitutional Rule, But Does It Really Matter?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 177, 179 
(2002); Lucian Paul Sbarra, Swiping the Dust Off of an Old Statute; United States v. 
Dickerson Eliminates the Miranda Warnings, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 481, 495-97 
(2000).  
 148 See Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2628-29. 
 149 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932). 
 150 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963). 
 151 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1970). 
 152 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967). 
 153 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237-38 (1967). 
 154 White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963). 
 155 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1961). 
 156 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
 157 James J. Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right to Exclusion: Constitutional 
Premises and Doctrinal Implications, 67 N.C. L. REV. 751, 751 (1989). 
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underlying rationale for exclusion.158  The rationales for 
exclusion stem from the constitutional rights they protect.159  A 
majority of exclusionary rule jurisprudence has occurred in the 
Fourth Amendment context, where its roots mainly lie.160  Since 
it was first announced, the rule has been extended as a general 
remedy for police misconduct that violates a defendant’s 
constitutional rights.  The rule requires suppression at trial of 
evidence obtained directly or indirectly161 through government 
violations of the Fourth,162 Fifth,163 or Sixth Amendments.164  
Exceptions have developed to the rule in each context.  To 
determine whether the Elstad exception should apply in the 
Sixth Amendment context, it is necessary to understand the 
rationales behind suppressing evidence in this realm. 
A. Development 
In Mapp v. Ohio,165 the Court applied the exclusionary 
rule to state authorities in state courts.166  In so doing, the 
  
 158 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (stating that “[a]s with 
any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas 
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served”).  See generally 
Tomkovicz, supra note 154. 
 159 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 452-54 (1984) (Stevens, J. concurring). 
 160 Barnett, supra note 16, at 938 n.2. 
 161 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963) (citing 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)); Nardone v. United 
States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939) (quoting Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 384 
(1947)). 
 162 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (applying the 
exclusionary rule in federal court to evidence obtained through a Fourth Amendment 
violation), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643; Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 
206, 223-24 (1960) (extending the exclusionary doctrine to state officials in federal 
trials); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (applying the exclusionary rule in state court to evidence 
obtained through a Fourth Amendment violation). 
 163 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 (1960); Bram v. United States, 
168 U.S. 532, 564 (1897). 
 164 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 2401-41 (1967); Massiah v. United 
States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
 165 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 166 Id. at 655. The Court first suggested the need for a remedy like exclusion 
in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), a case decided on Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment grounds.  The Court stated in Boyd that:  
Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of 
aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man’s own 
testimony, or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of 
crime, or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation [of the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments] . . . . 
  . . . .  
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Court gave three main justifications for implementing the 
exclusionary rule: (i) protection of the defendant’s rights, (ii) 
deterrence of police misconduct, and (iii) judicial integrity.167  
Almost immediately after Mapp, critics launched an assault 
against the rule arguing that excluding relevant evidence is 
fundamentally unfair and too costly.168  These drawbacks, 
critics argue, far outweigh the minimal deterrence and judicial 
integrity actually achieved by exclusion.169 
Arguably in response to this harsh criticism, the Court, 
in the late 1960s and into the 1970s, also began an attack on 
the rule.  This resulted in a significant narrowing of the rule’s 
scope170 as well as the formation of multiple exceptions that 
allow the admission of illegally obtained evidence at trial.  To 
create exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the Court 
abandoned most of the approach it set forth in Mapp.  Instead 
of relying on the three main rationales for exclusion, the Court 
limited its focus to whether exclusion of the evidence in the 
case at hand would prevent law enforcement misconduct in the 
future.171  The Court has identified four main situations in 
which the exclusionary remedy is not required despite a 
  
  . . . constitutional provisions for the security of person and property 
should be liberally construed.   
Id. at 630, 635.  It was not until Weeks, however, that the Court implemented the rule 
by excluding letters unreasonably seized from the defendant’s home.  The Weeks 
holding limited application of the rule to actions of federal officials for use in federal 
trials.  Id. at 398.  Finally, in Mapp, the Court applied the rule to state authorities in 
state courts.  Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. 
 167 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659-60. 
 168 See sources cited supra note 17.   
 169 See sources cited supra note 17. 
 170 In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978), the Court announced a 
standing requirement that only the victim of the constitutional violation can move for 
suppression and limited the rule to criminal trials.  The exclusionary rule also does not 
apply in tax actions by the IRS, United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447, 454 (1976); 
deportation administrative hearings, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1049 
(1984); or parole revocation hearings, Board of Probation v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 
(1998). 
 171 Interestingly enough, the two places where a defendant’s right to exclusion 
still remains part of the rationale is in violations of the Sixth Amendment context and 
the Fifth Amendment due process context.  See Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 525-26 
(1987); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 446-47 (1984) (disagreeing on the merits but 
certainly not rejecting the theory behind defendant’s argument that the Sixth 
Amendment exclusionary rule is designed to protect the right to a fair trial and the 
integrity of the fact-finding process).  See generally United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218 (extending exclusionary rule to identifications made in absence of counsel because 
of great unfairness that can occur if accused is put in line-up without a lawyer present). 
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constitutional violation: (i) when police act in good faith,172 (ii) 
when the connection between the illegal conduct and the 
acquisition of the challenged evidence is so attenuated that it 
dissipates the taint of the unlawful act,173 (iii) when the 
evidence was obtained through a source independent of the 
illegality,174 and (iv) when the evidence inevitably would have 
been discovered by independent, lawful means.175  Additionally, 
the Court has established an emergency exception to admit 
physical evidence derived from Miranda-defective 
confessions.176  The Court justified these exceptions by 
reasoning that the goal of deterrence is not always adequately 
served by excluding relevant evidence.177 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the exclusionary rule 
is not limited to evidence obtained directly from a 
constitutional violation.178  Rather, it excludes all evidence 
derived from a Constitutional violation as long as there is a 
sufficient connection between the proffered evidence and the 
illegality.179  The Court articulated this concept in the landmark 
case of Wong Sun v. United States.180  In that case, the police 
performed an illegal search of an individual’s apartment.181  In 
so doing, they learned of that individual’s participation in the 
sale of narcotics, which led agents to question another person 
who actually possessed the narcotics.182  After arresting this 
second individual for possession of narcotics, he implicated the 
  
 172 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (establishing a limited good 
faith exception for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant that is later found to be 
invalid). 
 173 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). 
 174 Murray v. United States 487 U.S. 533, 537-38 (1988); Segura v. United 
States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 (1984). 
 175 Nix, 467 United States at 448 (1984).  These exceptions come into play 
when the prosecution seeks to offer illegally obtained evidence in its case in chief.  
Separate rules and exceptions apply when the prosecution seeks to introduce such 
evidence for impeachment purposes.  See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-
28 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).  
 176 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984). 
 177 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610 (Powell, J., concurring) (focusing on the 
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 
(1984) (reasoning that there is “no basis . . . for believing that exclusion of evidence 
seized pursuant to a warrant will have a significant deterrent effect”). 
 178 See supra note 8. 
 179 See supra note 8. 
 180 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
 181 Id. at 486. 
 182 Id. at 487. 
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defendant Wong Sun.183  Officers went to Wong Sun’s dwelling, 
gained admittance, and arrested Wong Sun.184  Wong Sun was 
subsequently released, but returned to the police station 
voluntarily three days later and signed a statement.185  The 
Court suppressed the statement from the first individual and 
the narcotics found on the second individual, but admitted 
Wong Sun’s statement.186  Although the Court considered the 
excluded evidence fruits of the primary illegal arrest, it 
concluded that Wong Sun’s statement was not an illegal fruit 
because there was an intervening independent act of free will—
i.e., Sun’s returning to the police station voluntarily.  The 
Court found this sufficient to purge the taint of the primary 
illegality.187 
The derivative evidence doctrine also developed 
originally in the Fourth Amendment context,188 but has been 
used on a limited basis in the Fifth189 and Sixth Amendment190 
contexts as well.  As Wong Sun illustrates, the test for 
admissibility is whether the secondary evidence was obtained 
through exploitation of the initial illegality or by means 
sufficiently attenuated to remove the taint.191  The burden is on 
the government to show that the case falls into one of these 
exceptions.192   
  
 183 Id. at 475. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. at 475-77, 476 n.3, 491. 
 186 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-91. 
 187 Id. at 491. 
 188 See id. at 484-85; Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939); 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920). 
 189 See United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2626-27 (2004) (citing United 
States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 37 (2000); Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2608 
(2004); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 
438 (1974).  
 190 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 (1984); United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218, 220 (1967). 
 191 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486 (holding that suppression of fruits is required 
unless there was “an act of free will [sufficient] to purge the primary taint of the 
unlawful invasion”).  See Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 632-33 (2003); New York v. 
Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 20 (1990); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982); Rawlings 
v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 107 (1980); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 204 (1979); 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599 (1975). 
 192 Kaupp, 538 U.S. at 633. 
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B. Justifications for the Exclusionary Rule: Mapp and 
Miranda versus Massiah 
The current conception of the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule is that exclusion is neither a personal right, a 
remedy for a past wrong, nor even tied to the preservation of 
the adversarial system.193  The exclusionary rule is employed in 
the Fourth Amendment context solely to deter future 
unreasonable searches and seizures by police.194  The Miranda 
exclusionary rule is similarly premised only on deterrence.195  
In both contexts, exclusion is a court-created remedy that is not 
grounded in the language of the Constitution.  As a result, 
admitting evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment or Miranda does not directly violate the 
Constitution, which makes carving out exceptions to these 
rules easier for the Court to justify. 
In contrast, the Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule is a 
different species all together—one more akin to the Fifth 
Amendment due process exclusionary rule196 than the Miranda 
exclusionary rule.197  When first announced, the Massiah Court 
determined that a violation of the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel occurred only at the time that the 
  
 193 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961) (citing Elkins v. United States, 
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)); Weeks v. United States 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (citing Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)) overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643. 
 194 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (“The purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule is to deter unreasonable searches, no matter how 
probative their fruits.”) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216-17 (1979); 
Brown, 422 U.S. at 600-02); Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217 (“The rule is calculated to prevent, 
not to repair.  Its purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty 
in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.”). 
 195 It is important to note the difference between the Fifth Amendment 
exclusionary rule and the Miranda exclusionary rule.  The Fifth Amendment has a 
built-in exclusionary remedy.  The text itself states that no defendant can be compelled 
to give incriminating testimony about himself. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Thus, where 
police obtain compelled statements or confessions they are automatically excluded from 
trial.  Elstad, 470 U.S. at 304-05.  The Miranda exclusionary rule, on the other hand, is 
a court-created remedy that comes into play when government officials violate the 
strictures of Miranda.  See Id.  See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
The distinction between a constitutionally based rule and a court created one cannot be 
overemphasized. 
 196 See infra note 188; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978) 
(distinguishing, for the purposes of exclusion, between a procedural Miranda violation 
and true coercion; use of any involuntary statement should never be admitted in any 
way against a defendant). 
 197 Statements can be used for impeachment purposes if their 
“trustworthiness . . . satisfies legal standards.”  Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 
(1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975) (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 224). 
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wrongfully obtained evidence was admitted at trial.198  Linking 
the violation to the admission of evidence demonstrates the 
Court’s belief that exclusion is a personal right inextricably 
tied to the Sixth Amendment right itself.  In Nix v. Williams, 
the Court justified its decision to admit fruits of illegally 
obtained evidence based on a cost-benefit analysis of the 
deterrence theory.  At the same time, the Court accepted the 
defendant’s argument that exclusion is a present protection of 
the right to a fair trial.199  Thus, the current conception of the 
Sixth Amendment exclusionary remedy is that it serves two 
important functions: (i) maintaining the integrity of the 
adversary system by remedying the Constitutional violation 
and (ii) deterring future violations.200 
C. Fruits of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine and Miranda 
The Court has severely limited the exclusionary impact 
of Miranda on the fruits of confessions by relying on two main 
propositions: (i) that exclusion of the fruit of a poisonous tree is 
justified only if a constitutional right is violated and (ii) that a 
violation of Miranda is not, by itself, a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment.201 
In Michigan v. Tucker,202 the police arrested the 
defendant for rape and advised him of his right to remain silent 
and to an attorney.203  However, the officer did not inform 
Tucker that he could have an attorney present if he was 
indigent.204  The defendant gave an alibi for the time of the 
crime: that he was with his friend Henderson.205  When the 
police spoke to Henderson, he made incriminating statements 
implicating Tucker.206  Tucker moved to suppress Henderson’s 
  
 198 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
 199 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 446-48 (1984) (acknowledging that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel ensures the reliability of proffered evidence, but finding 
that the admission of physical evidence that would be inevitably discovered does not 
infringe on the integrity or fairness of a trial). 
 200 See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 282 n.6 (1980) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (writing that “Massiah imposes the exclusionary sanction on that conduct 
that is most culpable, most likely to frustrate the purpose of having counsel, and most 
susceptible to being checked by a deterrent”). 
 201 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 
U.S. 433, 444 (1974). 
 202 417 U.S. 433 (1974).  
 203 Id. at 436. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. at 436-37. 
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statement due to the deficiency in his own Miranda 
warnings.207  The Court rejected his argument, however, and 
admitted the evidence.208  The Court concluded that the 
exclusionary rule does not require suppression of reliable 
evidence when a procedural oversight in the administration of 
Miranda warnings occurs because such an error does not 
necessarily render a suspect’s statements involuntary.209  The 
Court extended the reasoning of Tucker to second confessions 
obtained after a Miranda-defective confession in Elstad.  The 
Court admitted Elstad’s second confession finding suppression 
inappropriate “[s]ince there was no actual infringement of the 
suspect’s constitutional rights,” and therefore “the doctrine 
expressed in Wong Sun that fruits of a constitutional violation 
must be suppressed” did not control in this case.210  
V. ANALYSIS 
A. The Derivative Evidence Rule Applies to Sixth 
Amendment Violations 
While originally articulated and developed in the Fourth 
Amendment context, the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence has 
made clear that the derivative evidence rule also applies to the 
Sixth Amendment.211  The most straightforward application of 
the rule occurred in Wade.212  There, the Court held that a 
defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel at pre-trial 
line-ups determining that the admissibility of in-court 
identifications must be governed by the Wong Sun213 exclusion 
rule.214  Then in Nix,215 the Court admitted the body of a murder 
victim that the police discovered after deliberately eliciting its 
whereabouts from the defendant in the absence of counsel.216  
While the defendant’s actual statements were excluded, the 
Court held that the condition of the body could be admitted at 
  
 207 Id. at 437. 
 208 Tucker, 417 U.S. at 437. 
 209 See id. at 444-45. 
 210 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985). 
 211 See, e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (noting that 
the fruits doctrine had been applied in the Sixth Amendment context); Nix v. Williams, 
467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1967). 
 212 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
 213 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
 214 Wade, 388 U.S. at 241. 
 215 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
 216 Id. at 437. 
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trial even though it was a fruit of the Sixth Amendment 
violation.217  The Court found that since the police had already 
formed a search party to look for the victim, they would have 
“inevitably” discovered the body.218  Nix, albeit convolutedly, 
also demonstrates the Court’s application of the derivative 
evidence rule in the Sixth Amendment context.  The Nix 
inevitable discovery exception only makes sense if in fact the 
derivative evidence rule bears on Sixth Amendment violations.  
Indeed, if there was no Sixth Amendment derivative evidence 
rule, then the Court would not have been compelled to create 
the exception that it did in Nix.  
What distinguishes the derivative evidence rule in the 
Sixth Amendment context from its Fourth Amendment 
counterpart, however, is its justification.  When invoking either 
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule—direct or 
derivative—the Court has come to focus solely on the 
deterrence rationale: “[both rules are] calculated to prevent, 
not to repair. . . .  [Their] purpose is to deter—to compel respect 
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available 
way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.”219  Indeed, 
such a justification makes sense.  If the police officers know 
that the fruits of their labors will be disregarded unless they 
follow proper procedures, then they are less likely to conduct 
illegal searches and seizures in the first place.  This rationale 
is also a workable concept in the Sixth Amendment context.  If 
police and prosecutors know that incriminating evidence will 
be excluded at trial if a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights 
are violated, then they will be less likely to interfere with an 
indicted defendant’s right to counsel. 
Beyond this, however, the Court’s opinions make known 
that the Sixth Amendment exclusionary rules serve a purpose 
in addition to deterrence.220  The Sixth Amendment, in 
conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the 
right to counsel at every critical stage of a prosecution.221  The 
right has been described as “indispensable,”222 in fact “vital,”223 
  
 217 Id. at 446-47. 
 218 Id. at 448-50. 
 219 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974) (quoting Elkins v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).  
 220 Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-47; United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 282 (1980) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 221 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45, 57 (1932).  
 222 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 168 (1985). 
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to the fair administration of our adversary system of criminal 
justice.  The entire line of Massiah cases has been decided on 
the premise that admitting statements deliberately elicited 
from a defendant in the absence of counsel denies the 
defendant the basic protections of the right.224  If this is so, then 
the use of the fruits of such a violation likewise exploits the 
defendant’s uncounseled status to his subsequent disadvantage 
at trial.  It follows then, that the Sixth Amendment 
exclusionary rule and derivative evidence rule, in addition to 
deterrence, function to preserve the fair trial rights of 
defendants, and as such, the integrity of the entire criminal 
system. 
Here again, Nix is instructive in a roundabout way.  
There, the petitioner argued that the Sixth Amendment 
exclusionary rule’s additional purpose made the “societal 
costs”—the competing interest of effective law enforcement—of 
excluding evidence irrelevant.225  The Court disagreed with the 
petitioner’s argument, but only because the evidence that he 
sought to exclude was (i) physical and (ii) would have been 
discovered anyway.226  The Court stated that the police conduct 
“did nothing to impugn the reliability of the evidence in 
question . . . . [Therefore] [s]uppression, in these circumstances, 
would do nothing whatever to promote the integrity of the trial 
process . . . [or] ensure fairness.”227  The Court did not reject 
outright the petitioner’s assertion that the Sixth Amendment 
exclusionary rule serves a purpose other than deterrence.  
Rather, the Court acknowledged and accepted such a 
justification, but found that exclusion of the evidence did not 
further this interest under the circumstances.228  In fact, 
excluding evidence that the police would have discovered 
anyway actually places them in a worse position than they 
would have been.229  The Court’s consistent use of the 
deterrence rationale—or rather the lack-of-deterrence 
rationale—to admit evidence that would otherwise be excluded, 
suggests that this added justification sets a higher bar of 
  
 223 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977). 
 224 Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 523-24 (2004); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 
477 U.S. 436, 457 (1986); Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176; Henry, 447 U.S. at 270; Brewer, 430 
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admission for evidence obtained in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.   
B. The Elstad Exception is not Applicable in the Sixth 
Amendment Context 
While the foregoing discussion certainly bolsters the 
assertion that the Elstad exception does not and could not 
apply in the Sixth Amendment context, the Eighth Circuit 
disagreed, finding that violations of the Miranda rule and the 
Sixth Amendment are not fundamentally different.230  Yet a 
close examination of the text of the Elstad decision itself 
reveals the Eighth Circuit’s egregious error.  To reiterate, the 
Elstad majority held that the defendant’s second statement, 
made after he had given a first, unwarned statement, was 
admissible in the prosecution’s case in chief, because it was the 
product of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.231  
Relying on the reasoning of Tucker, the Court held that a 
procedural violation of Miranda does not create a presumption 
of coercion and that the subsequent reading of Miranda 
remedies any taint resulting from such a procedural failure.232  
The Elstad decision thus establishes two criteria that must be 
met in order to trigger the exception: (i) the primary illegality 
must not be of constitutional magnitude and (ii) there must be 
no deliberate coercion or improper police practice in obtaining 
the initial statement.233  As will be shown below, the facts of 
Fellers fail both of these prongs. 
The Elstad Court began hewing the “fruit of the 
poisonous tree” doctrine early on in the opinion.  Writing for 
the majority, Justice O’Connor stated that the fruits metaphor 
is “misleading” when taken out of context, as the majority 
found it was in this case.234  The only appropriate situation in 
which to apply the fruits doctrine is in cases involving a 
constitutional violation.  Again, the Court’s analysis hinges on 
the characterization of Miranda as a mere prophylactic rule.  
The Court went on to say that the lower court incorrectly 
assumed “that a failure to administer Miranda warnings 
necessarily breeds the same consequences as police 
  
 230 United States v. Fellers, 397 F.3d 1090, 1093 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 231 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985). 
 232 Id. at 314. 
 233 See id. at 309. 
 234 Id. at 303-04. 
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infringement of a constitutional right, so that evidence 
uncovered following an unwarned statement must be 
suppressed as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’”235  Equating these 
two wrongs, the Court explains, fails to recognize the nature of 
the Miranda protections.236  In essence, the failure of police to 
advise suspects of their Miranda rights does not directly 
violate the Fifth Amendment.237 
O’Connor also cautioned the lower courts to distinguish 
between the role of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule—
to deter unreasonable searches no matter how probative their 
fruits—and the function of Miranda—to protect the right 
against self-incrimination.238 In Taylor v. Alabama, the Court 
held that “[any] confession obtained through custodial 
interrogation after an illegal arrest should be excluded unless 
intervening events break the causal connection between the 
illegal arrest and the confession so that the confession is 
‘sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.’”239  
But because Elstad does not involve a constitutional violation, 
the Court refused to apply the fruits doctrine.  Instead, it 
turned to its reasoning in New York v. Quarles and Tucker: 
that a procedural Miranda violation differs significantly from 
violations of the Fourth Amendment.   
Specifically, the Court noted that violations of the 
Fourth Amendment mandate broad application of the fruits 
doctrine because it serves “interests and policies that are 
distinct from those it serves under the Fifth.”240  Whereas the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is aimed directly at 
preventing illegal searches, the Miranda exclusionary rule has 
broader implications than the Amendment it is meant to 
uphold.  To illustrate, the failure to read Miranda 
automatically creates a presumption of compulsion.  Therefore, 
statements made without a warning are suppressed without 
question.  As a result, voluntary statements could be 
suppressed just because they are unwarned even though they 
  
 235 Id. at 304. 
 236 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 304. 
 237 As discussed earlier, the Court’s decision in Dickerson has invalidated this 
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 238 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 304. 
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were not actually compelled.241  But, the Fifth Amendment only 
protects against the use of compelled statements.242   
The Court went on to state that absent any showing of 
deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial 
statement, 
the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does 
not warrant a presumption of compulsion . . . . [and] subsequent 
administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a 
voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to 
remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier 
statement.243 
Thus, the failure to provide Miranda warnings creates a 
rebuttable presumption of compulsion.  It does not infringe 
upon a suspect’s constitutional rights, unless there is an actual 
showing of coercion.244  And, where there is no evidence of 
coercion in obtaining the first statement, the Court sees little 
concern that coercion provoked the second statement.  As a 
result, the Court concluded that the Miranda exclusionary rule 
can not require that statements and their fruits be discarded 
automatically as inherently tainted.  Errors in administering 
prophylactic Miranda procedures should not have the same 
“irremediable consequences” as police infringement on the 
Fifth Amendment itself.245   
When the police read Elstad his Miranda rights at the 
station, it remedied any taint present in the first unwarned 
statement because it was uncoerced.  After being so advised, he 
voluntarily waived his right to remain silent and his right to 
counsel.  Elstad proceeded to speak with law enforcement 
officials during which time he made incriminating statements.  
While a fruit of the first confession, this second and uncoerced 
statement exacts a high cost from law enforcement while doing 
little to protect the defendant against self-incrimination.  Thus 
the cost is high and deterrent effect low—an equation that has 
consistently added up to admission in the Court’s exclusionary 
jurisprudence.246 
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Contrary to the Eighth Circuit’s holding, applying the 
analysis laid out in Elstad to the facts of Fellers does not yield 
the same result.  The Elstad Court began by imploring the 
lower courts not to obscure the differences between the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule and Miranda.  But the 
differences acknowledged by the Court are not of the same 
magnitude when comparing the Fourth and the Sixth 
Amendment exclusionary rules.  Firstly, the Sixth Amendment 
exclusionary rule is a personal right tied directly to the 
enforcement of the Amendment’s protection itself.  Allowing 
evidence that was obtained as a result of a violation of the 
defendant’s right to counsel to be admitted at trial, or used to 
uncover other evidence that is then used at trial, renders the 
right essentially meaningless.  Secondly, the Sixth Amendment 
exclusionary rule does not present the same dilemma that the 
Miranda exclusionary rule does, namely overbreadth.  The 
Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule does not reach broader 
than the Sixth Amendment itself.  Rather, the exclusionary 
rule ensures that all rights guaranteed under the Sixth 
Amendment, which together ensure the right to a fair trial, are 
protected.  Finally, there is nothing merely procedural about 
violating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Since it is 
specifically accorded in the text of the Constitution, failing to 
honor that right directly violates the Constitution.  Based on 
this alone, Fellers would seem to fall outside the bounds of the 
Elstad exception.   
Elstad clearly states that to trigger the fruits doctrine—
as opposed to the Elstad exception to the fruits doctrine—the 
primary illegality must be of constitutional magnitude and 
there must be no intentional misconduct.  In addition to the 
violation at issue in Fellers being a constitutional one, the 
police officers obtained Fellers’ initial statement through 
deliberate and improper tactics.  Remember, the main 
rationale behind the exclusionary rule is deterrence.  In cases 
involving the timing of the Miranda warning, the Court has 
tended to be forgiving.247  Indeed, police officers are not lawyers.  
There have been situations in which the Court has found a 
  
York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 
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suspect to be in custody or under interrogation, thus triggering 
the application of Miranda, but where an average police officer 
would not have known as much.248  A similar situation occurred 
in Elstad.  The officers, while admitting retrospectively that 
Elstad was in custody, testified that they went to Elstad’s home 
solely to inform his mother about what was happening, not to 
interrogate Elstad.  The Court took stringent notice of 
surrounding factors, like the time of day and the comforting 
environment of his own home, to bolster the notion that the 
arresting officers were acting in good faith when Elstad made 
the first unwarned and incriminating admission.249   
In contrast, officers violate the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel when they “deliberately elicit” information from an 
indicted defendant in the absence of counsel.  The Court has 
held that deliberate elicitation differs significantly from the 
functional equivalent of interrogation concept.250  One such 
difference is the standard’s focus on the officer’s actions.  As 
the Court has already held, the officers in Fellers went to 
Fellers’ home with the sole intention of deliberately eliciting 
information from him.  Thus, the police used improper tactics 
in obtaining Fellers’ initial incriminating statements.  The 
Eighth Circuit found that suppressing the statement Fellers 
made in his home sufficiently deterred the Sixth Amendment 
violations because  
the officers acknowledged that they used Fellers’ initial jailhouse 
statements (obtained after securing a Miranda waiver) in order to 
extract further admissions from him, . . . [but did not make] 
reference to Fellers’ prior uncounseled statements in order to prompt 
him into making new incriminating statements.251 
This reasoning completely ignores the logic underlying 
the Elstad exception, that while the deterrent effect of the 
exclusionary rule is arguably lacking when the police are 
acting in good faith, there is no question that the exclusionary 
rule serves its purpose when the police blatantly act in bad 
  
 248 See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (holding that “the 
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faith, as they did in Fellers.  Allowing the police to remedy 
their blatant disregard for the Constitution by Mirandizing 
Fellers defies common sense and misinterprets precedent. 
In Elstad, the Court rejected Elstad’s argument that he 
had confessed the second time out of psychological compulsion.  
Elstad’s argument was based on the “cat-out-of-the-bag” theory 
announced in United States v. Bayer.252  The theory is that   
[once a suspect confesses,] no matter what the inducement, he is 
never thereafter free of the psychological and practical 
disadvantages of having confessed.  He can never get the cat back in 
the bag.  The secret is out for good.  In such a sense, a later 
confession always may be looked upon as the fruit of the first.253 
The Elstad Court reasoned, however, that the psychological 
pressure that exists after making a voluntary statement is 
neither the type of coercion that Bayer referred to nor that the 
Fifth Amendment protects against.  Since Elstad’s first 
statement was not coerced, but rather given voluntarily, 
receiving the Miranda warning at the police station was 
enough to remedy the initial wrong.254  When considered in 
light of the Sixth Amendment, however, the cat-out-of-the-bag 
theory is not so easily disposed.   
Furthermore, the fact that the Court has, as the Eighth 
Circuit points out, on one occasion, applied similar waiver 
analysis to Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel does 
not suggest that the rights are similar for purposes of the fruits 
doctrine.255  The reading of Miranda in the Fellers case does not 
remove the taint from the prior Sixth Amendment violation 
and thus does not justify the same result.  The Court, 
hearkening back to Powell, has consistently held that 
defendants need the “guiding hand of counsel” to restore the 
imbalance between them and the government.256  The reading 
of Miranda can do neither.  While the Eighth Circuit certainly 
downplays the role of counsel at post-indictment questioning, 
its own acknowledgment that “the scope of the right to counsel 
varies depending upon the usefulness of counsel to the accused 
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 253 Id. at 540. 
 254 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314. 
 255 Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296-97 (1988) (holding that where an 
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at a particular proceeding and the dangers to the accused of 
proceeding without counsel” belies this assertion.257  If Fellers 
had an opportunity to consult with counsel, then his lawyer 
could have told him not to answer the questions put to him by 
police in his home or his lawyer could have advised him that 
the statements he made at his home, in the absence of his 
attorney, could not be used against him at his trial.  Either 
scenario illustrates the important role that counsel could have 
played in Fellers.   
Finally, the Eighth Circuit’s reliance on Patterson v. 
Illinois is misplaced; Patterson does not govern Fellers.  In 
Patterson, police arrested the defendant as a suspect in a 
murder and a grand jury indicted him soon after.258  At this 
point, Patterson was entitled to his right to counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment.  Before questioning him, the police read 
Patterson his Miranda rights, and he waived them.259  At trial, 
Patterson argued that Miranda was not sufficient to warn him 
of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, so therefore he could 
not have knowingly and intelligently waived that right.260  
However, since Patterson had never even asked to speak with 
an attorney, the Court rejected this argument.261  The Court 
held, instead, that receiving the Miranda warning sufficiently 
informed him of his right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment.262  But, in Patterson there was no primary 
illegality before the defendant made incriminating statements, 
which renders Patterson virtually meaningless in evaluating 
Fellers.  Absent the primary illegality, the Court did not 
consider whether Patterson’s waiver of his right to counsel was 
made voluntarily, only if it was made knowingly and 
intelligently.  While Fellers did not request to speak with an 
attorney either, the facts of Fellers have not foreclosed the 
voluntariness question.  As the aforementioned analysis 
demonstrates, the primary illegality created a degree of 
coercion that would render his subsequent waiver of the right 
involuntary as well as unknowing and unintelligent. 
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While some have asserted that the Court’s decision in 
Patterson reflects an attitude of diminished protection for the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court carefully limited 
its holding and even left open a loophole in footnote nine.263  
The Court reassured readers that the similar waiver standard 
was limited to the post-indictment questioning context.  Justice 
White wrote that, in general, where a suspect has been advised 
of his Miranda rights, he will be presumed to have been 
“knowing and intelligent” in his waiver, but “[not] all Sixth 
Amendment challenges to the conduct of postindictment 
questioning will fail whenever the challenged practice would 
pass constitutional muster under Miranda.”264 Furthermore, 
the majority did not reject the idea that courts require extra 
warnings to be given about waiving the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.  Rather, it stated that as of then, the Court 
had not been presented with convincing enough language.  
Both of these facts demonstrate the Court’s continued 
emphasis on the paramount importance of the Sixth 
Amendment right.   
Based on the Court’s own reasoning, the Elstad 
exception is inapplicable to Fellers in particular and the Sixth 
Amendment in general.  But that is not where this analysis 
ends.  In a post-Dickerson world—where the Court has 
overruled the notion of Miranda as a mere prophylactic rule—
the Court’s reasoning in Elstad appears invalid.  The Court, 
while not going as far as to say that a Miranda violation is a 
constitutional violation, has held that Miranda is a 
“constitutional decision.”265  Initially, one might conclude that 
Miranda’s newly declared constitutional status subjects its 
prior exceptions, including the applicability of the fruits 
doctrine, to review.  But despite its characterization of 
Miranda the Court has reaffirmed the Elstad exception.266  The 
Court’s affirmation can only lead to one conclusion: that the 
Court is now relying on a cost-benefit analysis to justify its 
holding.   
Yet even when employing this rationale—whether the 
cost of exclusion outweighs the protection of the individual’s 
interest—in the Sixth Amendment context, the Elstad 
exception is still inapplicable.  The purpose of the Sixth 
  
 263 Id. at 296-97 n.9. 
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Amendment exclusionary rule is more than just deterrence.  
The exclusionary rule is a necessary component of the right to 
counsel, which the Court has recognized as a fundamental 
right.267  Therefore, while the cost of exclusion may still be high, 
the cost of inclusion is even higher.  Admitting evidence 
obtained directly or indirectly in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment would allow the right to counsel to be too easily 
circumvented.  This would infringe on a defendant’s right to a 
fair trial; a cost that always tips the scale in favor of exclusion.  
Certainly, ensuring accurate outcomes and fair processes are 
interests superior to the goal of securing convictions.  
C. The Admissibility of Fellers’ Second Confession Should 
Turn on a Traditional Fruit of the Poisonous Tree 
Analysis 
Since the Elstad exception is inapplicable in the Sixth 
Amendment context, the Fellers case must be analyzed using 
the traditional derivative-evidence rule.  Thus, the critical 
question is “whether, granting establishment of the primary 
illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has 
been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by 
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint.”268  In Brown v. Illinois, the Court set forth several 
factors to consider when determining whether a confession is 
the product of free will under Wong Sun: (i) whether Miranda 
warnings were administered before the confession, (ii) the 
temporal proximity between the arrest and confession, (iii) the 
presence of intervening circumstances, and (iv) particularly, 
the flagrancy of the official misconduct.269 
Fellers’ second confession was clearly a derivative of the 
first.  While Fellers did receive a Miranda warning before 
making his second confession, all of the other Brown factors 
suggest insufficient attenuation.  Fifteen minutes after Fellers 
made the first incriminating statement, the police transported 
him to the jailhouse where he made the second statement.  
There were no other intervening circumstances.  In fact, the 
same officers obtained both statements from Fellers and both 
  
 267 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). 
 268 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (quoting JOHN 
MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT: RESTRICTIONS UPON ITS DISCOVERY OR 
COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE 221 (1959)). 
 269 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975). 
1026 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:2 
statements referenced the same issues.  Finally, the 
misconduct of the police officers in this situation is obvious.  
They went to an indicted defendant’s house to arrest him, but 
before doing so attempted to get any bits of information out of 
him that they could.  The officers knew that if Fellers had a 
lawyer present, he would have been advised not to speak with 
them.  It is precisely this sort of disregard for constitutional 
principles that the Court has continuously invoked the 
exclusionary rule to prevent.  Therefore, Fellers’ second 
statement must be suppressed, unless the government can 
prove that it falls into another already established exception.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to 
counsel are indeed like apples and oranges.  By importing the 
Court’s reasoning in Elstad to the Sixth Amendment context 
and admitting the fruits of a Sixth Amendment violation in 
Fellers, the Eighth Circuit has significantly curtailed the 
protection of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, despite the 
fact that history, Supreme Court jurisprudence, and common 
sense dictate that this should not be the case.  The Elstad 
exclusionary rule should be limited to the Fifth Amendment 
context and cannot be applied to Sixth Amendment violations 
for three main reasons.  First, as illustrated above, the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is a greater, more protected right.  
Its violation is unquestionably a direct violation of the 
Constitution.  Second, the Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule 
serves a purpose beyond deterrence.  Namely, maintaining the 
integrity of the trial system itself.  It is a constitutionally 
required remedy.  Finally, the Court’s reasoning clearly reflects 
its intention to limit the exception to the Fifth Amendment 
context.  The purpose of the right to counsel is to protect a 
defendant from being convicted by his own ignorance of legal 
and constitutional rights.  Extending the Elstad exception into 
the Sixth Amendment context does just the opposite. 
In 1988, when the Court announced its decision in 
Patterson, some legal scholars viewed the decision as an 
onslaught of an assault against the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel protection, which had always received favor from the 
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Court.270  Two subsequent decisions—McNeil v. Wisconsin271  
and Texas v. Cobb272—did little to assuage these fears.  Some 
feared that Massiah was headed down the same path as 
Miranda.273  Nonetheless, other scholars have not read these 
decisions as an attack, but rather as necessary fine-tuning.274  
In a piece entitled Texas v. Cobb: A Narrow Road Ahead for the 
Sixth Amendment, the author noted that the only question 
remaining is how far the Court will go in narrowing the Sixth 
Amendment right and concluded, “Hopefully, it has gone far 
enough.”275  Regardless of one’s take on Patterson, McNeil, or 
Cobb, one issue is not debatable: extending the Elstad 
exception into the Sixth Amendment realm is going too far; it 
essentially cuts down the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine at 
its roots.  As every gardener knows, however, plants, even 
overgrown ones, flourish with careful pruning.  Therefore, 
before other courts chop, they should consider the purpose of 
the Sixth Amendment.  Once they do, they will realize that the 
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine must be given a chance to 
grow.  And so, this author respectfully urges courts to make 
peace with—indeed extend an olive branch to—the fruits of the 
poisonous tree doctrine by excluding any fruits that result from 
a violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.  
Jennifer Diana† 
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